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Abstract
The boom-bust cycles such as the episode of the “Internet bubble” in the late
1990s may be described as the business cycle driven by changes in expectations or
news about the future. We show that such news-driven cycles can be reproduced
by models with collateral constraint. We assume that an asset with ﬁxed supply
(“land”) is used as collateral, and ﬁrms need to hold collateral to ﬁnance their input
costs. The latter feature introduces an interaction between the ineﬃciencies in the
ﬁnancial market and in the factor market. The good news raises the price of land
today, which relaxes the collateral constraint. It, in turn, reduces the ineﬃciency
in the labor market. If this force is suﬃciently strong, the equilibrium labor supply
increases. So do output, investment and consumption. With augmented by adjust-
ment cost of investment, our model also generates procyclical movement in Tobin’s
Q. We also show that when the news turns out to be wrong, the economy may fall
into a recession, instead of simply jumping back to the initial steady state. This
is because, when the good news arrives, borrowers sell their land, since they need
less land to achieve the desired value of collateral. When the news turns out to be
wrong, the land price goes back to its steady state level, and hence the total value
of collateral becomes lower than the steady state level. It follows that the ﬁnan-
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1cial constraint becomes tighter, which increases the labor market ineﬃciency, and
reduces labor, output, and consumption.
Keywords: News-driven cycles; collateral constraints; Tobin’s q; bankruptcies.
JEL Classiﬁcations: E22, E32, E37, G12.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The boom-bust cycles such as the episode of the “Internet bubble” in the late 1990s may
be described as the business cycle driven by changes in expectations or news about the
future. Recently there has been a growing interest in examining the role of such “news
shocks” as a driving force of business cycles. The literature includes, among others,
Beaudry and Portier (2004a, b), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006), Christiano and
Fujiwara (2005), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006), Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2004) and
Lorenzoni (2005). As is well known, in the standard real business cycle model, changes in
expectations (or news shocks) move consumption and labor in opposite directions due to
the wealth eﬀect. For instance, if an increase in the expected level of future productivity
raises the present discounted value of income, the consumer increases both consumption
and leisure today, and hence reduces labor supply. It follows that output and investment
decline as well.
In order for news shocks to generate business cycles (i.e, comovement between con-
sumption, investment, labor, and output), the papers listed above modify preferences
and/or technology from the standard model. For instance, Beaudry and Portier (2004a,
b) introduce a certain type of complementarity between production technologies in a
two-sector model; Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006) introduce habit persistence
in consumers’ preference and a speciﬁc form of the adjustment costs in investment;
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) assumes preferences without income eﬀect on labor sup-
ply, the same adjustment cost as Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, and variable capital
utilization.
In this paper, we propose a diﬀerent mechanism to generate news-driven cycles. Our
story is based on collateral constraint and ﬂuctuations in asset prices play a key role
2in generating news-driven cycles. We consider an economy with a productive asset with
ﬁxed supply (“land”). Producers must pay the costs for inputs, such as labor, in advance
of production, and they need external funds to ﬁnance them. The amount that they can
borrow is limited by the value of the collateral (land and/or capital). Its important
consequence is that the collateral constraint makes the allocation of labor ineﬃcient by
introducing a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption. Furthermore, the wedge becomes greater
as the collateral constraint binds more tightly. Thus, the labor market ineﬃciency and
the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency are closely linked with each other.
We consider two models of collateral constraint. For the sake of exposition, we start
with a very simple model of collateral constraint, which has a representative household.
In this model, news of a future productivity increase generates a boom today as follows.
The news raises the price of land today, which relaxes the collateral constraint. Since the
input ﬁnance is collateral constrained, the relaxation of the collateral constraint reduces
the ineﬃciency in the labor market (the gap between the wage rate and the marginal
product of labor becomes lower). It shifts the labor demand curve outward. If this
force is suﬃciently strong, it oﬀsets the wealth eﬀect on the labor supply schedule, and
the equilibrium labor supply increases. So do output and investment. Consumption
increases because the wealth eﬀect of the good news. With augmented by adjustment
cost of investment, the model also generates procyclical movement in Tobin’s Q.
We then consider a version of Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1998) model, which has two
types of agents: households (lender) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). Having two types of
agents brings about a new feature. In the representative-household model, when the news
actually turns out to be false, the economy essentially jumps back to the initial steady
state, although there are some transitional dynamics. In particular, false information
does not cause a recession: the level of output does not get lower than the steady state
level. In our second model with two types of agents, however, if the information turns
out to be wrong, the economy falls into a recession. This is because, when the good
news arrives, the price of the collateral asset increases, and hence entrepreneurs need
3a less share of land to achieve the desired value of collateral. Hence, in response to
the good news about future, entrepreneurs sell their land. When the news turns out to
be wrong, the land price essentially goes back to its steady state level. However, since
the share of land held by entrepreneurs is lower than the steady state level, the value of
their collateral is lower than the steady state level. It follows that the ﬁnancial constraint
becomes tighter, which increases the labor market ineﬃciency, and reduces labor, output,
and consumption.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe our ﬁrst
model. The collateral constraint is formalized in the manner of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). In Section 3, we describe the second model in which the collateral constraint is
formalized in the manner of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998). Section 4 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Model 1: Lack of commitment
In this section we describe our ﬁrst model of collateral constraint. The collateral con-
straint arises because borrowers cannot credibly commit to repay their debt. For sim-
plicity, the ﬁrst model is set up so that we can use a representative household framework.
Thanks to this, the dynamics of the model would be easily and clearly understood. We
shall see that what is crucial in our model is the interaction between the ﬁnancial market
ineﬃciency and the labor market ineﬃciency. We also see that, with adjustment costs of
investment, our model naturally generates procyclical movement in Tobin’s Q.
2.1 Basic model
Our model economy is a closed economy that consists of continua of identical households
and banks, whose measures are both normalized to one. A representative household
consists of a worker-manager pair. At the beginning of each period, the worker and the
manager split, and act separately until the end of the period. The worker supplies labor
nt to a ﬁrm owned by another household at the wage rate wt. The manager hires labor
4˜ nt and purchases intermediate input mt from other households to produce output, yt,












where kt is capital and at is land, both of which the manager owns at the beginning of
period t. Parameter At represents the level of productivity. The productivity growth
rate, ζt ≡ lnAt − lnAt−1, evolves stochastically following an AR(1) process:
ζt =( 1− ρ)ζ + ρζt−1 + ²t, (2)
where ρ > 0, and ²t is an i.i.d. noise with mean zero.
We assume that a bank can issue bank notes that can be circulated in the economy
as payment instruments. The manager needs to borrow bank notes because we assume
that he must pay for the inputs in advance of production. Let bt be the amount that the
manager borrows. Then, given bt, the manager’s choice of ˜ nt and mt is constrained by
wt˜ nt + mt ≤ bt. (3)
Borrowing and lending are intra-period; if Rt is the gross rate of bank loans, the man-
ager is supposed to repay Rtbt after production. (As discussed below, since borrowing
and lending are intra period, Rt = 1 in equilibrium.) As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
however, the manager cannot fully commit himself to repay the debt. He can abscond
without repayment at the end of period t, and the bank cannot keep track of the abscon-
der’s identity from the next period on. Instead, an imperfect commitment technology is
available for the manager and the bank: The manager can put up a part of capital and
land that he owns as collateral, and the bank can seize the collateral when the borrower
absconds. Therefore, the value of collateral gives the upper limit of bank loan:
bt ≤ φkt + ψqtat, (4)
where φ and ψ (0 ≤ φ,ψ ≤ 1) are the ratios of respective assets that can be put up as
collateral, and qt is the price of land in period t. The bank’s problem is to maximize
5the return on the loan, (Rt − 1)bt. Since the bank faces no risk of default if the intra-
period loan bt satisﬁes (4), competition among banks implies that the return on the loan
should be zero (Rt − 1 = 0) in equilibrium. Therfore, in equilibrium, the banks become
indiﬀerent to the amount of bt, and work as passive liquidity suppliers to the households.
So we can neglect the banks’ decision-making, since it has no eﬀect on the equilibrium
dynamics of this economy. Conditions (3) and (4) together imply the following collateral
constraint on the manager’s purchase:
wt˜ nt + mt ≤ φkt + ψqtat. (5)
At the end of period t, after production, the household sells yt,r e p a y sRtbt,a n d
determines consumption, ct, investment, it, and land, at+1, subject to the ﬂow budget
constraint:
ct + it + qtat+1 + Rtbt = qtat + wtnt + bt + πt,
where πt is the proﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm owned by this household: πt = yt − mt − wt˜ nt,a n d
Rt = 1 in the equilibrium. The reduced form of the budget constraint is
ct + it + qtat+1 = qtat + wtnt + yt − mt − wt˜ nt. (6)
A representative household maximize its lifetime utility, U,d e ﬁned over sequences of
consumption and leisure, 1 − nt. To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path, we






[ct(1 − nt)γ]1−σ, (7)
where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on the information available at time 0.
The law of motion for capital accumulation is
kt+1 = it +( 1− δ)kt, (8)
where δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
6The dynamics of this economy are determined as the solution to the representative
household’s problem, in which the household maximize (7) subject to (1), (2), (5), (6),
and (8). The market clearing conditions are
yt = ct + it + mt, (9)
nt =˜ nt, (10)
at =1 . (11)
Note that the ﬁnal output is also used as the intermediate input in this model, as usually
assumed in the literature (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford [1995], Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan [2004], and Commin and Gertler [2006]).
T h er o l eo ft h ec o l l a t e r a lc o n s t r a i n t : Our model departs from the standard real
business cycle model in a minimal way. The only diﬀerence is the collateral constraint on
input ﬁnance.1 For instance, if φ and ψ in (5) are so large that the collateral constraint
does not bind at all, our model would reduce simply to the standard model. How does our
collateral constraint aﬀect the economy? The key is the interaction between ineﬃciencies
in the labor market and in the ﬁnancial market.
To see this, let λt and μt be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (6) and (5),

















qtat + wtnt + yt − mt − wt˜ nt − ct − it − qtat+1
i¾






1Our model is close in spirit to Mendoza (2006). He assumes that payment for inputs is collateral
constrained, while capital is used as collateral.
7which is standard. The labor demand decision, however, is diﬀerent from the standard
model and it does not imply that the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate.
Using the equilibrium condition nt =˜ nt, the labor demand condition is expressed as






λt measures how tightly the collateral constraint (5) binds. Since the left-
hand side of (12) is the marginal product of labor, xt is the wedge between the marginal
product of labor and the wage rate. We have xt > 0 if the collateral constraint binds,
and xt can be viewed as a measure of the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency. At the same time,
it is the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the wage rate, and hence it is
a measure of the labor market ineﬃciency.
Notice that the eﬀect of a reduction in xt on the labor demand function is similar
to the eﬀect of a positive productivity shock. As long as a higher price of a collateral
asset today relaxes the collateral constraint, it aﬀects the labor demand curve in the
same way as a positive productivity shock today, by reducing the ineﬃciency in the
labor market. It is then clear how our collateral constraint help generate news-driven
cycles. Suppose that a piece of news arrives that there is a positive productivity shock
in the future. Such news raises the land price today, and tends to relax the collateral
constraint.2 Other things being equal, it reduces the labor/ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency,
xt, and shifts the labor demand curve outward. If this force is strong enough to overcome
the wealth eﬀect on the labor supply curve, the equilibrium labor supply rises, and so
do consumption, ivnestment, and output.
Our result implies that the collateral constraint on input payment may be a powerful
tool to reproduce business cycles, in contrast to the formulation by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). In their model, consumption smoothing and capital accumulation are distorted,
because the agents cannot issue optimal amounts of intertemporal debt, since debt is-
suance is constrained by collateral. These intertemporal distortions in consumption and
capital accumulation are said to have quantitatively insigniﬁcant eﬀects in business ﬂuc-
tuations (See Cordoba and Ripoll [2004]). Our result show, however, that when working
2For this to be the case, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/σ,m u s tb es u ﬃciently high.
8capital expenditure (or input payment) is constrained, the collateral constraint may have
as i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on business ﬂuctuations.
T h er o l eo fi n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t s : The requirement of intermediate inputs, mt,i n
the production technology (1) is not necessary to generate news-driven cycles in our
model. The collateral constraint (5) is enough for that purpose. However, it reinforces
the eﬀect of the collateral constraint and does increase the set of parameter values which
are consistent with news-driven cycles.








As the demand for labor, the demand for the intermediate good, mt,i sa l s od i s t o r t e d
when the collateral constraint (5) binds (i.e., when xt > 0). Equation (13) shows that
in response to a fall in the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency, xt, the intermediate input,
mt, increases more than proportionally to the increase in gross output, yt. T h i si sa n
additional force shifting the labor demand curve (12) outward, and hence reinforces the
mechanism described above. Indeed, using (13) to eliminate mt, the marginal product
of labor can be expressed as
(1 − η)(1 − α − ν)
yt
nt











As long as η > 0a n dxt > 0, a fall in the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency, xt, expands the
marginal product of labor.
The above mechanism can also be seen by looking at the total factor productivity
(TFP) in the production of value added, yt − mt. By eliminating mt from (1), the gross












It follows that the production function for value added is















9Then, TFP for the production of value added, ˜ A(At,x t), is deﬁned as












where ∂ ˜ A/∂x<0i fη,x t > 0. Thus, a fall in the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency increases
TFP in the production of value added.3
Numerical experiments: Our numerical experiments follow Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2006). For t ≤ 0, the economy is at the deterministic steady state, where
the representative agent believes that there shall be no productivity shock at all in the
future: ²t =0f o ra l lt.I np e r i o dt = 1, however, the agent receives news that there will
be a positive productivity shock at t = T: ²T =¯ ²>0. The agent is totally conﬁdent
about the news, so that, for t =1 ,...,T − 1, she believes that ²T =¯ ² with probability
one. At t = T, however, the news may or may not turn out to be true, and both cases are
considered. There is no productivity shock except possibly at t = T: ²t =0f o rt 6= T.
The unit of time is a quarter, and we set T = 5 so that the news received in period
1 says that the productivity shock occurs in a year later. The parameter values are set
as follows: β = .99; γ =1 .3; σ = .5; δ = .025; η = .5; α = .3; ν = .03; φ =0 ;ψ = .1;
¯ ζ =0 ;ρ = .95; ¯ ² = .0025. Most of these values seem standard. As a benchmark, we
consider the case where only land is used as collateral (φ = 0), but including capital
in the collateral (φ > 0) does not change the main result. The value of ψ is chosen so
that the collateral constraint binds tightly enough. With this value, the steady-state
value of xt = μt/λt is 0.085. For our story of news-driven cycles to work, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS), σ−1, must be greater than one. This is because, if
the EIS is less than one, a higher rate of productivity growth tends to reduce the value
of land relative to output. Thus, in order for a future productivity shock to relax the
collateral constraint, we need EIS to be greater than one. In our simulation, we set the
EIS equal to two (σ =0 .5). Here, we’d like to stress that what matters in our model is a
3It is pointed out by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004) that frictions in ﬁnancing intermediate
inputs are observed as changes in the TFP in a standard growth model. The same mechanism works in
our model.
10high EIS rather than a low risk aversion (there is nothing stochastic in our simulation),
although our utility function does not distinguish them. Setting the EIS greater than
one appears consistent with the empirical evidence: see, for instance, Mulligan (2002),
Gruber (2006), and Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003).
The model is ﬁrst detrended by At, and then solved numerically by log-linearization
using the method of Uhlig (1999). Figures 1-2 plot the dynamic responses of the economy
to the news shock. They corresponds to the case where the news turns out to be wrong,
and the case where it turns out to be correst, respectively.4 Both ﬁgures show that the
positive news shock raises output, consumption, investment, and labor for t =1 ,...,4.
This comovement of the main macro variables can be understood by looking at the
behavior of the Lagrange multipliers, λt and μt. When the news of a future increase
in productivity arrives in period 1, the value of land held by the representative agent
rises, and also her expected future wage rates go up. As a result, her marginal utility of
wealth, λ1, falls, and consumption increases. Other things being equal, it tends to reduce
labor supply. Thanks to the collateral constraint, however, in our model, the higher land
price relaxes the collateral constraint, and hence lowers μ1 and x1 = μ1/λ1. As discussed
above, a lower x1 reduces the ineﬃciency in the factor markets, which increases both the
wage rate, w1, and the TFP. With this eﬀect suﬃciently strong, labor supply increases
and so do output and investment.
Note that, as Figure 1 shows, if the news turns out to be false in period 5, the
economy goes back to the initial steady state almost immediately. In particular, the
level of output does not fall below the steady-state level. In this sense, we may say
that false information does not create a recession in this model of collateral constraint.
We shall see in Section 3 that in our second model, which is based on the costly state
veriﬁcation, the economy falls into a recession when the news turns out to be false.
4The plotted values are detrended ones. This is why variables such as value added, consumption, etc.
decline for t ≥ 5 in Figure 2, that is, in the case where the productivity shock does hit the economy in
period ﬁve as the news has suggested.
112.2 Adjustment costs and Tobin’s Q
In the previous work such as Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) and Christiano, Motto and
Rostagno (2006), a speciﬁc form of adjustment cost of investment is necessary to generate
news-driven cycles. Following the terminology of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006),
the level speciﬁcation of adjustment cost is











Here x is the steady state level of it/kt.T h eﬂow speciﬁcation of adjustment cost is











Here x is the steady state level of it/it−1.
The models of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2006) generate news-driven cycles with the ﬂow speciﬁcation (17), but not with the
level speciﬁcation (16) of adjustment cost. Furthermore, as discussed in detail by Chris-
tiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006), their model does not yield procyclical movement in
Tobin’s Q, which may not be consistent with the observation that stock prices ﬂuctuate
procyclically.5 The model of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) has the same problem. In this
section, we show that our model can generate news-driven cycles with both speciﬁcations
of adjustment cost, and that Tobin’s Q ﬂuctuates procyclically in response to the news
shock.
F o rt h es a k eo fs i m p l i c i t y ,w ec o n t i n u et of o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r eφ =0i nt h e
collateral constraint (5).6 Let λc,t, μt,a n dλk,t be the Lagrange multipliers associated
5To make Tobin’s Q procyclical, they augment their model with sticky prices and wages, and a certian
form of monetary policy rule.
6If φ 6= 0, the collateral constriant must be modiﬁed as wt˜ nt + mt ≤ φpk0,tkt + ψqtat.
12with the ﬂow budget constraint (6), the collateral constraint (5), and the law of motions






Let us start with the level speciﬁcation (16). The ﬁrst-order condition for it implies









Thus, the investment-capital ratio is higher than the steady state value δ if and only if
Tobin’s Q is greater than unity. Letting ˆ it ≡ ln(it/At), ˆ kt ≡ ln(kt/At−1), ˆ pk0,t ≡ lnpk0,t,




ˆ pk0,t + ˆ kt − ζt,
where ζt =l nAt −lnAt−1. Hence, with this speciﬁcation, procyclical investment implies
procyclical Tobin’s Q.
As a benchmark, we set σH = 1, that is, the elasticity of investment with respect to
Tobin’s Q is unity, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The other parameter
values are the same as those used for Figure 1. Figure 3 shows the impulse responses
t ot h es a m en e w ss h o c ka si nF i g u r e1 ,w h e r et h en e w st u r n so u tt ob ef a l s e .T h en e w s
shock increases Tobin’s Q, as well as other macroeconomic variables. It is worth noting
that introducing the adjustment cost of investment enlarges the set of parameter values
that are consistent with news-driven cycles. For instance, the EIS, σ−1,c a nb em a d e
very close to unity. Figure 4 plots the result when σ =0 .9. The eﬀects of the news shock
are smaller compared to the benchmark case of σ =0 .5, but we still obtain comovements
of the variables of interest.
With the ﬂow speciﬁcation (17), the relationship between the level of investment and

























13We set σG =1 5 .1 folloging Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006). The other parameter
values are the same as before. Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to the news shock.
Again, the model is successful in generating comovements, including Tobin’s Q.
Our success in reproducing procyclical Tobin’s Q may be explained as follows: Loos-
ening of the collateral constraint increases labor and intermediate inputs, leading to an
increase in the marginal product of capital. Therefore, capital becomes more valuable,
implying higher Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno’s
(2006) model and in Jaimovich and Rebelo’s (2006) model, when the good news arrives,
agents anticipate that they need to pay a large amount of adjustment costs during tran-
sition to the new steady state; thus, agents increase investment today to reduce the
adjustment cost that they must pay in the future; and the increase in investment makes
capital more abundant and cheeper today. Christiano et al. needs to introduce sticky
prices and a Taylor-type monetary policy rule in order to generate the procyclicality in
the price of capital. We do not need such a complication in the model to explain capital
prices. Policy implications are quite diﬀerent: On one hand, Christiano et al. conclude
that the news-driven cycle, if it exists at all, should be caused by a mechanical conduct
of monetary policy and therefore the central bank is to be blamed; and on the other
hand, our model implies that the news-driven cycle may be an inevitable feature of the
economy in which agents are subject to collateral constraints.
3 Model 2: Costly state veriﬁcation
In this section we consider a version of the costly-state-veriﬁcation model due to Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1997, 1998). Speciﬁcally, we augment Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1998)
model with land, and assume that only land can be used as collateral in the debt contract.
The key diﬀerence from the ﬁrst model is that the second model has two types of agents:
households (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). We ﬁrst show that this two-agent
model can also reproduce news-driven cycles, and that with the level speciﬁcation of the
adjustment cost, it can reproduce procyclicality of Tobin’s Q. The basic mechanism that
generates this result is the same as in the ﬁrst model. In our second model, however,
14when the news of a future increase in productivity turns out to be wrong, the economy
falls into a recession (the level of output falls below the steady state level). This feature
is absent in our ﬁrst model, as well as in the models of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2006) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006).7
The economy consists of a representative household and a continuum of entrepreneurs
with unit mass. The household consumes, supplies labor, accumulates capital, holds land,
and lends to entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur produces output under idiosyncratic risk,
holds land, and borrows from the household.
Household: The household maximizes (7) subject to the ﬂow budget constraint:
ct + it + qtat = wtnt + rk,tkt +( qt + ra,t)at +( Rt − 1)bt, (18)
and the law of motion for capital accumulation, either (17) or (16), where rk,t and ra,t
are the rental rates of capital and land, respectively, and (Rt−1)bt i st h er e t u r no ni n t r a -
period loans, bt, to entrepreneurs. Although entrepreneurs are subject to idiosyncratic
risk, the loans to them are intermediated through a mutual fund so that the household
faces no risk. Since the loans are made within period, Rt = 1 must hold in equilibrium.
Thus, the household becomes indiﬀerent to bt in the equilibrium.
Let λc,t and λk,t be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the ﬂow budget con-
straint (18) and the law of motion of capitla accumulation (17) or (16), respectively.





Entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurs are indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. We assume that only land can
be used as collateral in the debt contract. As a result, entrepreneurs do not hold physical
capital. Entrepreneur i holds land, a0
t(i), at the beginning of period t, produces output,
yt(i), and then determines consumption, c0
t(i), and land holdings, a0
t+1(i). Entrepreneurs
7Note that the original model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) does not generate news-driven cycles.
The success of our model in this respect is due to the introduction of an asset in ﬁxed supply (land) in
the debt contract.
15faces an idiosyncratic productivity shock in producing output. Speciﬁcally, entrepreneur i
produces yt(i), employing intermediate input, mt(i), land services, ˜ at(i), capital services,
kt(i), and labor input, nt(i), under an idiosyncratic shock, ωt(i), using the following
production technology:
yt(i)=ωt(i)F[At,m t(i),˜ at(i),k t(i),n t(i)], (19)
where
F(A,m,a,k,n)=A(1−η)(1−α)mηa(1−η)νk(1−η)αn(1−η)(1−α−ν).
The idiosyncratic shock ωt(i) is private information; it is i.i.d. across agents and across
time; its probability distribution and density function are denoted by Φ(ω)a n dφ(ω),
respectively; its mean is unity, and its standard deviation is denoted by σω. Note that
˜ at(i) 6= a0
t(i), in general. If ˜ at(i) >a 0
t(i), entrepreneur i rents ˜ at(i) − a0
t(i)f r o ma n o t h e r
entrepreneur or the household; and if ˜ at(i) <a 0
t(i), he rent a0
t(i) − ˜ at(i)t oa n o t h e r
entrepreneur.
The quantities of inputs, mt(i), ˜ at(i), kt(i), nt(i), are determined prior to the real-
ization of ωt(i). Therefore, the input costs, st(i) ≡ mt(i)+wtnt(i)+rk,tkt(i)+ra,t˜ at(i),
must be paid in advance. Cost minimization and the Cobb-Douglas technology leads to
the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
wtnt(i)=( 1− η)(1 − α − ν)st(i),
rk,tkt(i)=( 1− η)αst(i),
ra,t˜ at(i)=( 1− η)νst(i),
mt(i)=ηst(i).
Let et(i) be the net worth of entrepreneur i. Since the only asset that entrepreneur
i holds at the beginning of period t is a0
t(i), her net worth is given by
et(i)=( qt + ra,t)a0
t(i).
Since st(i) must be paid in advance, entrepreneur i needs to borrow st(i)−et(i)f r o mt h e
household. Let pt be the markup rate, that is, a project of size st(i) yields gross return
16ptst(i)ωt(i). Let μptst(i) be the cost of monitoring a project of size st(i). As discussed
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998), given {pt,e t(i)}, the optimal debt contract is
described by {st(i),ωt}. Here, the borrower with net worth et(i) conducts a project of
size st(i), and pays back to the lender ptst(i)ωt as long as ωt(i) ≥ ωt.I f ωt(i) < ωt,
then the borrower goes default, and pays back only ptst(i)ωt(i) <p tst(i)ωt.T h u sΦ(ωt)
equals the fraction of entrepreneurs who go default. As shown in Appendix, the optimal











where f(ω)a n dg(ω) are the functions deﬁned in Appendix.
Given {pt,ωt}, entrepreneur i chooses {c0
t(i)} and {a0













1−ptg(ωt) . We assume that β0 < β to ensure that entrepreneurs are
borrowing constrained in equilibrium.8
Because of the linearity in the entrepreneurs’ utility and the debt contract, the en-
trepreneur sector is easily aggregated by integration over i.L e tzt denotes the aggregate
variable of zt(i)f o rzt(i)=st(i),c 0
t(i),a 0






8Strictly speaking, we need to prevent the possibility that the net worth of each entrepreneur becomes
zero. For that sake, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) assume that entrepreneurs supply labor. Here, however,
for simplicity, we follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) and consider the limiting case where entrepreneurs’






























Since the price of output is unity (numeraire), pt is the mark-up rate:
yt = ptst. (25)
The market clearing conditions are
ct + c0
t + it + mt =[ 1− Φ(ωt)μ]yt, (26)
˜ at =1 . (27)
The factor market equilibrium conditions are given by:
wtnt =( 1− η)(1 − α − ν)st, (28)
rk,tkt =( 1− η)αst, (29)
ra,t˜ at =( 1− η)νst, (30)
mt = ηst. (31)
Equilibrium: The equilibirum dynamics of this economy are determined by the solu-
tion to the household’s problem, i.e., maximization of (7) subject to (18) and either (17)
or (16); the aggregate entrepreneurs’ problem, (20)—(23); and the conditions (24)—(31).9
9The total amount of loans from the household to entrepreneurs is given by bt = st − (qt + ra,t)a
0
t,
though it is irrelevant to the dynamics.
18The ﬁnancial-market ineﬃciency and the factor-market ineﬃciency: As in the
ﬁrst model, a crucial feature of this model is the interaction between the ineﬃciencies in
the ﬁnancial market and in the factor market. The ineﬃciency in the factor market is
measured by the mark up rate, pt, which is the wedge between the marginal products and
the input prices. For instance, it follows from (25) and (28) that the marginal product
of labor equals pt times the wage rate:




and similar conditions hold for the other inputs.
The ﬁnancial-market ineﬃciency may be measured by ωt, which is the threshold
value for default. Equation (23) implies that pt = p(ωt) is an increasing function of
ωt, that is, an increase in the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency will raise the factor market
ineﬃciency. In addition, the deﬁnition of g(ωt) in Appendix implies that p(ωt)g(ωt)i s
an increasing function of ωt. It follows from (22) that, other things being equal, a higher
land price, qt,l o w e r st h eﬁnancial market ineﬃciency ωt. Therefore, this model has the
same mechanism as the ﬁrst one: a higher land price qt tends to reduce the ﬁnancial
market ineﬃciency ωt, which, in turn, decreases the factor-market ineﬃciency pt.T h i s
is the basic mechanism that generates news-driven cycles.
Similarly, as in the ﬁrst model, the requirement of intermediate inputs, mt,i m p l i e s
that the (observed) TFP depends negatively on the ineﬃciency of the ﬁnancial market.
The value added in this economy is given by [1−Φ(ωt)μ]yt −mt. Then, deﬁne the TFP
in this economy, ˜ A(At,p t,ωt), as




Equations (24), (25), (31), and (32) imply that
˜ A(At,p t,ωt) ≡
∙










Because of the monitoring cost, the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency ωt directly aﬀects the
TFP through the term Φ(ωt)μ. But the negative dependence of ˜ At on pt is based on
19the same mechanism as we have seen in (15). Hence, the TFP is, again, a decreasing
function of the ﬁnancial-market ineﬃciency, ωt. As a result, other things being equal,
a higher land price, qt, tends to increase the TFP. Although η > 0 is not necessary to
generate news-driven cycles, it reinforces the mechanism that drives news-driven cycles.
Numerical experiments: We conduct the same experiments as those in Section 2:
At t = 1, the agents receive a signal that ²T = ²>0, which turns out to be true or false
at t = T. The parameter values are set as follows: β = .99; β0 = β∗.973; σ = .5; γ =1 .3;
η = .5; ν = .03; α = .3; δ = .025; σH =1 ;σG =1 5 .1; σω = .37; μ = .15; ρ = .95;
² = .0025; and T = 5. Here, the values for β0, σω and μ are taken from Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1998). The rest are the same as in Section 2.2.
Here we report the case where the news turns out to be wrong at t = T.T h e
results for the level speciﬁcation model (16) and for the ﬂow speciﬁcation model (17)
are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Just as in the representative-agent model of
Section 2.2, the news of a future productivity increase brings about a boom in periods
t =1 ,...,T − 1. Aggregate consumption, value added, investment, and labor all rise
during these periods.10 The measured TFP also rises for t =1 ,...,T−1. The mechanism
that the news shock produces the boom is the same as in the previous model. Tobin’s
Q rises with the level speciﬁcation of adjustment cost, while it does not with the ﬂow
speciﬁcation.
What is notable in the second model is what happens when the news turns out to
be wrong in period t = T. In the previous model with a representative household, when
the news turns out to be wrong in period t = T, the economy essentially jumps back to
the initial steady state, although there are some transitional dynamics (see Figures 1, 3,
5). In particular, the wrong news does not cause the economy to fall into a recession
(the economic activity does not fall below the steady state level). That is not true in
10The aggregate consumption is the sum of the household’s consumption and the entrepreneurs’ con-
sumption. As can be inferred from the dynamics of λc,t, the household’s consumption slightly declines
for t =1 ,...,T−1. The aggregate consumption rises because the entrepreneurs’ consumption increases
by amounts that are more than oﬀsetting the declines in the household’s consumption.
20our second model. In period t = T, when the news turns out to be false, value added,
consumption, and labor supply get lower than their steady state levels.
What causes this remarkable diﬀerence is the fact that there are two types of agents
in the second model: borrowers and lenders. Look at the dynamics of the share of land
held by entrepreneurs, {a0
t+1} (note that in the ﬁgures, the plotted value of a0 at t is a0
t+1,
rather than a0
t). When the good news hits the economy in period t = 1, entreprenrus
sell their land to households so that a0
2 is lower than the steady state level, a0,w h i c hi s
reﬂected in the sharp decline in a0 occuring at t = 1 in Figures 6 and 7. Enrepreneurs
s e l lt h e i rl a n di np e r i o d1 ,b e c a u s e ,g i v e nt h ei n c r e a s ei nt h el a n dp r i c ec a u s e db yt h e
good news, entrepreneurs need less land to achieve their desired level of net worth (or
collateral). So the share of land held by entrepreneurs becomes lower than the steady
state level as long as the price of land is higher than its steady state level. It follows
that, when the news turns out to be wrong in period T, the share of land held by
entrepreneurs at the beginning of period T is lower than the steady state value: a0
T < a0.
The enrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint (22) and the markup equation (25) imply that,






Here, p(ω)/(1 − p(ω)g(ω)) is increasing in ω. Since at this point our agents realize that
the productivity increase does not happen, the land price goes back to the steady state
value: qT ≈ ¯ q. Then, the fact that entreprenerus hold a share of land which is less
than the steady state level, a0
T < a0, implies that the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency gets
higher, ωT > ω, which, in turn, raises the factor market ineﬃciency, pT.A s a r e s u l t ,
the economy falls into a recession in period t = T,a st h eﬁgures show. Note also that
the countercyclicality in ωt in the ﬁgures can be interpreted as the countercyclicality
in bankruptcies, which seems realistic but is not reproduced in the original models of
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998).
214C o n c l u s i o n
The boom-bust cycles such as the episode of the “Internet bubble” in the late 1990s may
be described as the business cycle driven by changes in expectations or news about the
future. We have seen that such news-driven cycles can be reproduced by models with
collateral constraint. Key assumptions are that an asset with ﬁxed supply (“land”) is
used as collateral, and that ﬁrms are collateral constrained to ﬁnance the input costs.
The ﬁrst assumption is to ensure that the price of a collateralized asset ﬂuctuates enough
in response to news about future productivity growth. The second assumption is to
introduce an interaction between the ﬁnancial market ineﬃciency and the labor market
ineﬃciency.
We start with a simple model of collateral constraint with a representative household.
In this model, news of a future productivity increase generates a boom today as follows.
The news raises the price of land today, which relaxes the collateral constraint. Since the
input ﬁnance is collateral constrained, the relaxation of the collateral constraint reduces
the ineﬃciency in the labor market (the gap between the wage rate and the marginal
product of labor becomes lower). It shifts the labor demand curve outward. If this
force is suﬃciently strong, it oﬀsets the wealth eﬀect on the labor supply schedule, and
the equilibrium labor supply increases. So do output and investment. Consumption
increases because the wealth eﬀect of the good news. With augmented by adjustment
cost of investment, the model also generates procyclical movement in Tobin’s Q.
We then consider a version of Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1998) model, which has two
types of agents: households (lender) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). Having two types of
agents brings about a new feature. In the representative-household model, when the news
actually turns out to be false, the economy essentially jumps back to the initial steady
state, although there are some transitional dynamics. In particular, false information
does not cause a recession: the level of output does not get lower than the steady state
level. In our second model with two types of agents, however, if the information turns
out to be wrong, the economy falls into a recession. This is because, when the good
news arrives, the price of the collateral asset increases, and hence entrepreneurs need
22a less share of land to achieve the desired value of collateral. Hence, in response to
the good news about future, entrepreneurs sell their land. When the news turns out to
be wrong, the land price essentially goes back to its steady state level. However, since
the share of land held by entrepreneurs is lower than the steady state level, the value of
their collateral is lower than the steady state level. It follows that the ﬁnancial constraint
becomes tighter, which increases the labor market ineﬃciency, and reduces labor, output,
and consumption.
In comparison with the existing models of the news-driven cycles, our collateral con-
straint models are simpler and exhibit more realistic performance. Collateral constraint
on input ﬁnance by a ﬁxed-supply asset may be a good ingredient to develop a com-
prehensive theory of the business cycles from a point of the “News” view (Beaudry and
Portier [2005]).
5A p p e n d i x
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), we derive the optimal contract for intra-period
debt for an entrepreneur that faces an idiosyncratic risk.
We consider an entrepreneur with his own fund x. If he undertakes a project of size s,
it generates stochastic return pωs units of output, where p is a constant that represents
the market rate of mark-up, and ω is a unit-mean iid random variable. The probability
distribution of ω is Φ(ω) and the probability density is φ(ω). The entrepreneur must
borrow s − x from the household, while ω is private information for the entrepreneur.
The lender must pay μps to monitor the outcome of the project, where μ is a constant.
As Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) argue brieﬂy, it is well known that in this costly-
state-veriﬁcation setting, the optimal ﬁnancial contract is a risky debt. Given (p,x), the
optimal contract is characterized by (s,ω), where s is the size of the project, i.e., the size
of the borrowing is s − x; and the amount that the borrower repay is
ps × min{ω,ω}. (34)
ω can be viewed as the threshold value for default: The lender will monitor the project
23outcome if and only if the entrepreneur reports that ω is less than ω; and in such a case
the lender will conﬁscate all the returns from the project, psω.









min{ω,ω}Φ(dω) − Φ(ω)μ. (36)
We assume that lending is fully diversiﬁed across projects, so that the lender only
cares about the expected rate of return, and that borrowing and lending are intra-period,
so that the equilibrium rate of return is unity. Under these assumptions, the optimal
contract (s,ω) is determined as the solution to the following problem, given (p,x):
max
s,ω
psf(ω)s . t . psg(ω) ≥ (s − x). (37)
The solution is (implicitly) given as
1
p
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